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Views Read Edit View history. In other projects Wikiquote. Only "liberal" and "decent" peoples, respectively, are considered "well-ordered" and deserving of mutual respect, reciprocity, and unconditional non-domination. Liberal peoples are characterized by three basic features: 1 a reasonably just and representative constitutional democratic government, 2 a shared sense of political culture and what Mill referred to as "common sympathies" and 3 a certain moral character corresponding to the two moral powers-the capacity to have, revise and pursue a conception of the good as well as the capacity to act on and apply a sense of justice Rawls, , pp.
Rawls outlines only one type of decent people, the decent hierarchical society DHS , although he notes that there may be other types , p. A DHS is characterized by two features: 1 the society is not externally aggressive, and 2 it possesses three interrelated internal features- a. Societies burdened by unfavorable conditions are those which would be well-ordered where they not hampered by the lack of institutional resources or a suitable political culture Rawls, , p.
Benevolent absolutisms refer to despotisms which may honor some human rights but do not consult or involve their people in social and political processes Rawls, , p. Thus, beyond simply dealing with reciprocal and respectful relations between well-ordered peoples, Rawls wants to address the proper response to those peoples which violate these fundamental principles.
In so doing, Rawls addresses much of the substance of contemporary international politics: the justifiable grounds for humanitarian intervention, the proper conduct of states during war, the duty of well-ordered societies to assist financially or otherwise so-called "burdened societies", and the extent of liberal toleration for non-liberal societies.
Yet this list is notable for what it lacks. Rawls excludes those instances which make problematic the boundaries between overly tidy conceptions of "peoples" characterized by a deep political unity and uncommon, perhaps non-existent, homogeneity. The section that follows examines Rawls's limited treatment of migration and citizenship issues, their practical implications in the non-ideal realm of contemporary global politics, followed by critiques of his approach to these issues. In addressing critiques and responses to Rawls's understanding of migration issues, it is important to note first and foremost that few theorists have directly addressed this issue.
This arises out a number of factors, above and beyond Rawls's limited treatment of the topic. One reason for this is a general glut of examination of the rights attached to immigration within political theory more generally Seglow, , p. However, much of the debate around TLoP thus far has centered on questions of international distributive justice, considering immigration rights to be a subset of this area of normative theorizing, if the issue is raised at all. If, as Brown notes, the "Rawlsian 'mother lode' is sufficiently rich and productive that workers in this particular quarry ill not run out of subjects to develop", this remains a seam largely untouched by the theoretical pick-axes Brown, , p.
Due to the subtle and somewhat opaque relationships between these two areas of international justice, many of the critiques discussed below focus more on the underlying assumptions which drive Rawls's position on these issues, rather than directly critiquing Rawls on migration. Yet these critiques are introduced in order to demonstrate the difficult and volatile philosophical terrain in which Rawls finds himself while trying to navigate a course between particularistic conceptions of national interest and universalistic conceptions of the fundamental equality of all human beings.
Rawls on the restriction of immigration: territory as property. In the course of TLoP, Rawls mentions migration issues only twice pp. Much of the responsibility for dealing with immigration falls upon national governments, being "the effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as well as maintaining the land's environmental integrity" , p.
Thus, Rawls argues that the territorial space of a country ought to be considered as an "asset" of a clearly-defined people. To the extent that no authority is put in charge regulating the borders of this property, there is a potential for overuse or misuse and the risk that this resource cannot support the inhabitants in perpetuity.
Throughout the piece, this will be referred to as Rawls's property-based justification for the limitation of immigration. The practical implications of Rawls's property-based justification for the limitation of immigration are far from clear. Clearly, Rawls's conception challenges the extreme liberal egalitarian position that modern territorial borders exist as neo-feudalistic remnants of past patterns of domination and subjugation and should be replaced by a policy of open borders Carens, Echoing particularistic themes found within communitarian and liberal nationalist conceptions of global justice, Rawls argues rather that the very notion of justice in a well-ordered state rests upon the existence of clearly defined borders, without which the state's ability to provide for its people would be drastically compromised.
Along these same lines, Heath argues in a defense of Rawls that "freedom of movement of individuals across national borders [ Yet there seems to be no clear "tipping-point" at which we could decide that an influx of migrants is hindering the government's ability to provide for its already existing pool of citizens. In laying out his justification in this way, Rawls authorizes recipient governments to restrict migrant access to residency or citizenship on the basis of the way in which they acting as the effective agent of a people perceive the threat.
The contentious discourse of immigration rights expansion, however, shows the vast discrepancies in how this threat to public goods and services is understood, defined, and acted upon in terms of policy. Cornelius and Rosenblum note that, "[e]ven if the actual effects of immigration on receiving countries are typically modest, many citizens of migrant receiving states perceive negative consequences-economic and noneconomic-that lead them to prefer more restrictive immigration policies" , p.
Thus any normative theory of international justice which replicates these assumptions risks enabling malleable and potentially innaccurate popular perceptions to determine a society's immigration restrictions. Unsurprisingly, for cosmopolitan theorists of international justice such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, Rawls's line of reasoning with regard to territorial "ownership" has been a frequent point of contention, due to its minimization of the moral consequences which flow from our contemporary state of global interdependence. Charles Beitz concedes to Rawls the sense of collective responsibility flowing from being a member within a political community , p.
Yet Beitz feels the argument that there must be a territorially delimited, exclusive notion of property to achieve this sense of common enterprise risks reifying existing conceptions of territoriality and state sovereignty. Beitz points to the fact that the "circles of affinity" which Rawls describes are historically variable, evident in the existence of the contemporary multicultural state itself , p.
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The fact that most liberal-democratic citizens express their affinities in terms of an expansive civic identity as a member of a political community rather than identifying themselves as a member of their family, clan, tribe, or ethnic group is evidence that the scope of our concern for collective resources evolves over time. Even if we are to conceive of territory as the "property" of the "effective agent" of the state, however, Thomas Pogge argues that Rawls pays insignificant attention to the broader context in which this property resides, one of deteriorating structures and rules for less wealthy and powerful societies b, pp.
Thus, while individual societies may have a sense of ownership over their territorially delimited space, the global economic structures which impact to what ends they utilize this asset vary tremendously. Pogge is intensely critical of the fact that the domestic commitment to preserving "economic background justice", present in AToJ and PL, is almost completely absent in TLoP.
In light of the economic interdependence of our contemporary world and a concern for the individual human being as the "ultimate unit of moral concern", Pogge thus calls for a global extension of the "difference principle" contained within Rawls's domestic theory of justice , p. In addition to these concerns with Rawls's conceptualization of territory as property, there remains the basic fact that his fear of overuse, misuse, or degradation rests upon a highly- disputed empirical claim. The notion that migrants, as new members to a political community constitute only a "cost" to the society and do not also provide the society with an equal or greater degree of benefits, benefiting all members of the community in the process, remains in dispute.
Benhabib writes "there is sufficient empirical evidence [. Thus, Benhabib argues that we ought to consider this claim in light of many of the characteristics of migrant communities: migrants tend to be disproportionately of working age, many of them are pushed to migration by economic factors meaning that they are willing to work, and the fact that the host country often does not to have pay for their education due to their age , p.
Rawls on the restriction of immigration: the "withering away" of structural causes. Rawls goes on to say that many of the domestic scenarios which provoke immigration religious and ethnic persecution, political repression, denial of human rights, starvation and famine, population pressures would become less pronounced or disappear in world with greater numbers of well-ordered societies.
He writes, "[t]he problem of immigration is not, then, simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia" Rawls, , p. Rawls is asserting that many of the causes of immigration result from domestic inefficiencies and injustices which, within a more just global order, would cease to be a pressing international concern. This is not so much a justification for limiting immigration as an expression of the hope that in the context of a realistic utopia, there will be little to no migration to regulate. This is referred to throughout the paper as Rawls's notion of the "withering away" of the structural causes for large-scale migration.
Again, it is unclear what practical implications one would draw from Rawls's notion of the gradual erosion of immigration. Rawls does assert that well-ordered societies have a duty to assist "burdened societies", although strictly in terms of helping to establish the proper institutions and culture so as to become well-ordered, as he discounts the value of foreign aid in this regard Rawls, , pp. In addition, well-ordered states may also intervene to stop the most egregious and threatening injustices committed by "outlaw states" Rawls, , pp.
Yet beyond these extreme instances which compel a state to action, well-ordered states are fairly limited in the strategies they might employ to encourage societies to move in more liberal directions, due to Rawls's emphasis on toleration and his hesitancy to impose a liberal upon vision upon non-liberal societies. To the extent that we are to witness a gradual conversion of the world's societies towards a more liberal orientation, much of that process is presumably going to occur via the internal dynamics of individual peoples.
The problematic aspect of Rawls's faith in the gradual emergence of a more well-ordered, and eventually more liberal world, is that it remains unclear the channels via which this dissemination might actually occur. Rawls puts into place significant restraints regarding public criticism of decent hierarchical societies and limits intervention in non well-ordered societies to only the most extreme cases. Liberal societies may not publicly criticize the internal structures of decent societies, and liberal societies are not to give bilateral incentives to encourage political liberalization as it compromises a society's right to self determination , pp.
The question remains by what mechanisms would transformation by which large-scale migration would cease to be a pressing issue. Kok-Chor Tan suggests, "the one possible liberalizing tendency I can think of within the global setting would be the effects of cultural exchanges [ However, even this may in fact be negated by the restrictions on freedom of speech which Rawls is willing to accept in decent, non- liberal societies. Thus, the wave of internal liberalization which Rawls see gradually dissolving the "push-pull" factors of international migration may be undermined by the very conditions he proposes to protect self-determination and advance toleration among the society of well-ordered peoples.
Even to the extent that this broader liberalizing process could happen, there remain doubts whether a world of immobile individuals locked within the borders of their own societies would be in any way desirable. Responding to this question, Seyla Ben-habib eloquently writes, [in] Rawls's ideal utopia, peoples become windowless monads who have no interest in mixing, mingling, and interacting with others. This is certainly a vision of an ordered world but it is also the vision of a static, dull world of self-satisfied peoples, who are indifferent not only to each other's plight but to each other's charms as well , p.
Similarly, Bonnie Honig writes, "the novelties of foreignness, the mysteries of strangeness, the perspective of an outside may represent the departure or disruption that is necessary for change" b, p. Migration, conceived of as an instrumental means to an end by Rawls, may actually be an intrinsically rewarding end in itself. Rawls on the restriction of immigration: the rights of the community. Later in TLoP, Rawls reasserts his property-based justification for limiting immigration, reiterating that a "tragedy of the commons" scenario would be the inevitable result of any system which did not place an agent in charge for granting access to the community and promoting an ownership-based sense of responsibility.
However, Rawls buttresses this claim with justifications that strongly resonate with communitarian conceptions of international justice. He writes that "a people has at least a qualified right to limit immigration" in order "to protect a people's political culture and its constitutional principles" , p. In Rawls's eyes, unrestricted immigration opens up a society to a host of potentially hostile outside influences which risk degrading the integral character of the political community.
This latter claim is referred to as Rawls's communitarian justification for immigration restriction. Once again, the practical implications of Rawls's communitarian justification are somewhat murky.
John Rawls (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
At what point a migrant population constitutes a threat to either political culture or the foundational political principles of a society is not as clear-cut a notion as Rawls would like to make it. As with the threat to shared resources, the lack of an objective basis by which to determine the threat to culture and institutions would again risk making such restrictions subject to unstable perceptions of threat.
Yet, the basic point that Rawls makes is fairly straightforward.
To the extent that citizenship no longer exists as a concrete political identity that delineates an inside-group from an outside-group, it can no longer instill unity among citizens and be a status towards which they look with pride and a sense of belonging. In short, Rawls fears membership in the political community may become one status among many, rendered unstable by competing loyalties and ineffectively cementing the bond between fellow citizens. Yet many have seen complications arising from the "communitarian turn" within Rawls's international theory of justice.
Many critics have highlighted the incongruity of the notion of a "people", conceived of as a bounded territorial entity possessing a set of shared normative and institutional characteristics, with the reality of world of shifting and overlapping identities and power structures. Pogge feels that Rawls's concept of "peoples" offers what he calls a "double vagueness". First, it remains unclear what types of groups should count as a people and whether groups which do not reside within a recognized sovereign state have any standing in the Law of Peoples.
Secondly, it remains unclear how the notion of a people should be delimited; an array of options present themselves-culture, descent, residency, self-selection, etc. Pogge, , p. Benhabib writes that the very notion of a clearly delineated and contiguous people-hood, which informs so much of Rawls's theorizing at the international level, is ultimately "an aspiration, not a fact" , p. Simon Caney similarly argues that Rawls's typology of "peoples" at the international level is simply too rigid to allow us to theorize concretely about the tangible international system , pp.
As existing societies are highly unlikely to fall into one category or another, Caney suggests a continuum as representing a more realistic way of categorizing the complex multi-faceted societies we encounter in the current international system Lastly, Michael Doyle examines the existing state system to determine whether Rawls's theoretical category of "decent hierarchical societies" actually manifests itself with any frequency.
He notes that relatively few examples exist, and there remains no evidence that liberal states actually view them in a different light, and thus more deserving of respect, than the more expansive category of "non-liberal" societies p. Other critics charge that Rawls's conception of peoples leads to distortions in his conceptualization of human rights at the international level. Beitz writes Rawls's notion of peoples leaves him unable to develop a "freestanding" conception of fundamental human rights. From the cosmopolitan position of the fundamental moral worth of the individual, Beitz argues that our notions of human rights ought to be justified on the basis of the negative effects which abuses have on "persons", rather than their potential externalities for abstract "peoples".
Rawls's notion of respecting human rights is ultimately not based on the injustice that human rights abuses inflict upon the individual, but the broader threat that they cause to the international community. Rawls characterizes those "outlaw states" which abuse human rights as "aggressive and dangerous" stating that, "all peoples are safer and more secure if such states change, or are forced to change their ways" , p.
The notion that human rights abusers always constitute an external threat, however, is ultimately another unresolved empirical question, and Rawls's stance seems to imply that other members of the society of peoples would lack sufficient reasons to confront a society which can brutally oppress its own people, while keeping the horrors confined within its own borders and remaining externally passive. Though Rawls notes that such instances may arise in a footnote, he offers little guidance here saying only that such states "may be subject to some kind of intervention in severe cases" , p.
This seems to imply that victims of such regimes would have to make their claims and appeals for justice on the basis of the threats that violations pose to the international community, rather than appealing on the basis of their own basic human rights. As a result, cosmopolitans argue that the foundational basis for "human rights" becomes uprooted in Rawls's thought, no longer tied to the individual but the positive externalities that respect for human rights has for international stability.
One should also note that while Rawls draws in a communitarian argument to justify exclusion on the basis of protecting a society's political culture and principles, he does not flesh out any qualifications to this potentially extreme view. Rawls cites Walzer's Spheres of Justice to support his argument for the necessity of concrete territorial borders with the right to exclude as they see fit, Walzer's treatment of the issue is much more nuanced.
For example, Walzer is willing to advance a right to immigration in instances of homeland status, such as for refugees pushed abroad by conflict or economic devastation. He writes that in the context of "turbulent historical instances" these individuals have a right to look to their homeland with "hope and expectation", citing past instances in which this reintegration has occurred , p.
Turning lastly to Rawls's comments on emigration and the role it plays in his larger theory, he addresses the issue in the context of religious toleration within a non-liberal decent hierarchical society. While many of the elements of Rawls's theory of justice discussed previously seem to imply a form of liberal communitarianism, here we see Rawls trying to explicitly trying incorporate protections for the rights of individuals. Nevertheless what is "essential", in Rawls's own words, is that no minority religion should be denied the ability to practice in peace, absent fear of persecution.
To this end, Rawls states that, in order to mitigate against even the possibility of intimidation, "a hierarchical society [must] allow and provide assistance for the right of emigration" Rawls, , p. Italics added Adhering to this minimum level of internal religious toleration demonstrates a sincere commitment to a conception of the common good, and illustrates that notions of good do not simply take into account one dominant group within society. By allowing for emigration, Rawls claims that a DHS demonstrates at least a minimal commitment to the common good and provides a means of escape for individuals persecuted on the basis of their religion or belief system, thereby "render[ing] its institutions worthy of toleration [by other societies]" , p.
Thus, Rawls advances a right to emigration for members of a decent non-liberal society; in fact, he makes it is an essential component of liberal states considering decent societies as worthy of toleration. However to affirm this right, Rawls offers no corresponding requirement that those who emigrate ought to be accepted as members of another political community Tan questions the point of mandating a right to emigrate "if it is not reinforced by the demand that states also be obliged to accept immigrants" , pp.
While Rawls is adamant in saying that persecuted minorities should have the option of exit, under his system those who seek to utilize it may ultimately face a more harrowing existence as nomadic "stateless persons", in search of a society that will accept them. Rawls was aware of this potential criticism and attempts to preempt it by claiming in a footnote that many rights require the actions of a voluntary second party in order to fully realize their meaning , p. It may be objected that the right of emigration lacks a point without the right to be accepted somewhere as an immigrant.
But many rights are without point in this sense: to give a few examples, the right to marry, to invite people into one's house, or even to make a promise , p. Rawls is correct in this sense.
Justice After Rawls
One's right to marry does not entail a requirement that one is guaranteed a suitable spouse and the right may, for a variety of reasons, never be realized. Yet for Rawls, the right to emigration in this instance is a crucial requirement, perhaps the lynchpin, in creating a global order whereby liberal societies and decent, non-liberal societies can operate in terms of mutual respect, with the alternative being, "a fatalistic cynicism which conceives of the good of life solely in terms of power" Rawls, , p. The lack of a means by which individuals can emigrate from societies in which they face persecution, at least by Rawls's logic, risks the dissolution of the international society of peoples, and thus it's ambiguous and incomplete status ought to be suspect.
While Rawls sees this right of exit as essential enough to mandate decent societies provide financial assistance to those seeking exit, he remains reluctant to place any requirements on potential recipient societies to allow these persecuted minorities into their societies, and offers little or no justification for this, aside from these somewhat weak analogies.
A right to exit which is not supported by measures to ensure its actually being utilized risks compromising even Rawls's thin conception of human rights, namely that individuals have a "sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought" , p. Thus, in his attempt to extend his domestic theory of justice to the international level, Rawls encounters a number of problems as he attempts to expand liberal toleration, reciprocity, and respect outwards to the society of peoples while retaining even a thin conception of human rights.
Here, the focus has been limited to critiques of the underlying assumptions which drive his approach to migration, an area where it seems that Rawls's theory gives us very little guidance. Stanley Hoffman, upon publication of the lectures from which TLoP was compiled, saw very few points-of-contact with international reality, stating that, "Rawls may eventually find ways to bring his theories closer to international reality, but he has a long way to go" , p. Yet the section that follows suggests that paucity and problematic nature of Rawls's thoughts on global migration is not the product of his liberal political vision per se, but the inevitable result of any liberal-democratic attempt to reconcile universalistic notions of individual rights with a vision respecting and tolerating the will of existing political communities.
The striking juxtaposition of universalistic and particularistic principle Rawls employs in his treatment of migration reinforces the difficulty of what he is attempting to do in TLoP. At the simplest level, the bifurcated nature of the theory arises out of the fact that the question of belonging within a political community has two fundamentally different kinds of answers, "a universalist answer everybody and a nationally particularist answer members of the nation " Bosniak, , p.
The inadequacy in Rawls's treatment of migration within TLoP lies not simply in oversights, confusion, or lack of clarity, but the fundamental tension he attempts to navigate between a liberal understanding of the fundamental equality of all individuals and a democratic understanding rooted in membership within a circumscribed political community. As Tan states, the problem in Rawls's political liberalism is an "inherent theoretical problem" we encounter in attempts to balance toleration for the democratic community with its liberal commitments to the individual , p.
The complexity of straddling these competing principles manifests itself first in the limited treatment of migration within TLoP. Secondly, the universalistic- particularistic tension is evident in Rawls's shaky attempts to "balance" these competing principles, and remove the need for vibrant and pluralistic democratic negotiation of their meaning-imparting a sense of closure with regard to membership in the political comunity which is in actuality much more complex and elusive.
lohydmontranlau.tk German legal theorist Carl Schmitt would famously go so far as to say these competing principles risk the dissolution of liberal emocracy altogether, torn between the fundamental contradictions in notions of sovereign self-determination and universalistic, egalitarian rights claims. Schmitt would argue that "in the omain of the political, people do not face each other as abstractions but as politically interested and politically determined ersons, as citizens, governors, or governed, politically allied or pponents" and would warn against attempting to "abstract out hat is political, leaving only universal human equality" ], p.
To the extent we attempt to inject the political with iberal conceptions based on the equality of all, Schmitt claims e degrade the value of the political and undermine the unity of he demos , pp. Of course, we must tread lightly when using Schmitt to situate our thinking on the tensions within modern notions of liberal democracy, for we know that his pursuit of unity led him in iercely illiberal and anti-democratic directions.
The challenge then, becomes to use Schmitt's insights regarding the tensions within the normative content of liberal democracy, to enlarge our understanding of the challenges of constituting the political community while maintaining and protecting a conception of basic human rights.
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Or as Chantal Mouffe argues, the task is to "use Schmitt against Schmitt-to use insights of his critique of liberalism in order to consolidate liberalism-while recognizing that this was not, of course, his aim" , p. Contra Schmitt, the normative tensions between the universalistic and particularistic elements of liberal democracy need not mean that liberal democracy can never endure.
Yet this tension does require our recognition while we adopt the position "that these two commitments can be used to limit one another, that they can be rene gotiated, rearticulated, and resignified" Benhabib, , p. If we use the lens of these competing principles to analyze Rawls's approach to immigration and negotiating membership within the political community, the bifurcated character of his vision begins to make sense, albeit while still remaining problematic as a guide for dealing with migration in contemporary world politics. The set of critiques addressed in the previous section can be united by their shared uneasiness with Rawls's attempts to navigate between these competing tensions.
Rawls wants to affirm universal basic rights on the individual level, evident in his arguments regarding the right to emigrate and the duty of states to assist potentially persecuted minorities in doing so. However, he also recognizes the only entity which has effectively secured and consolidated these rights in the contemporary world is the modern state Hence the multiple in which he states the need to protect the community against the "threats" which migration poses to its institutions, its political culture, and its social democratic systems of redistribution.
Thus, while Rawls seems to recognize the desperate situations that may produce immigration pressures most notably persecution of minorities , he cannot adhere to a regime of migrant rights which he believes will threaten the integrity of the very entity, the modern state, which has been the only effective means of maintaining notions of individual rights. Ironically then, Rawls has subsumed the individual under an abstract notion of the collective not due to any disregard for the individual, as cosmopolitan theorists tend to claim, but out of the firm conviction that the collective political community is the only entity capable of guaranteeing the individual his or her rights.
However, the danger of relying upon this conception of society in order to affirm the rights of those who reside within it, is that one remains blind or inadequately attentive to the many millions of individuals who somehow reside in spaces between these cohesive and unified political communities.
In dealing with migration and citizenship issues in the contemporary world, a more flexible approach, capable of recognizing the many degrees of proximity to membership and inclusion, must be found. In the concluding pages of this piece I suggest that insights from a post-foundationalist strain of democratic theory, agonistic pluralism, may offer such flexibility and provide us with a more democratically defensible means of negotiating exclusion from the political community.
Towards an agonistic approach to citizenship and migration. Agonistic pluralism, or agonism, is a strain of democratic theory which both draws upon the liberal understandings of rights, toleration, and autonomy found within Rawls and others while simultaneously radicalizing these notions and critiquing existing conceptions of liberalism Owen, , p.
Through an agonistic lens, contentious democratic engagement become the goal of our political encounters, displacing notions of harmonious social cooperation or overlapping consensus. However, it would be a mistake to read agonism as "celebrat[ing] a world without points of stabilization", a notion we might find in a more avowedly postmodern conception of international politics.
Instead, agonism simply recognizes the "perpetuity" and enduring nature of contestation, and the elusiveness of a consensus which does not somehow marginalize alternative points-of-view Honig, , p. Rather than seeking to eliminate these aspects of the political, agonism attempts to engage and re-engage these moments in the most inclusive and contentious democratic settings possible, allowing a multiplicity of voices to engage in the struggle to frame our most foundational political concepts Goi, , p.
The Rawlsian conception of international migration, with its strong particularistic notions of cohesive and closed communities, does not require any justification be made to those marginalized by the borders of the political community, one of the most significant forms of coercive political power in the modern world. From an agonistic perspective, the legitimacy of political systems is rooted in radical pluralism and exercise of popular sovereignty, and as such, this framework of exclusion would need to be reconsidered. This ultimately means providing agonistic political spaces for those "outside the circle of who 'counts' [and who] cannot make claims within the existing frames of claim making" Honig, b, p.
While this would not rule out the exercise of power against political outsiders, it would offer the political communities an opportunity to engage those "whose contending identity gives definition to contingencies in [our] own way of being" Connolly, , p.
Related The notion of global toleration and its contentious role for Rawlss Law of Peoples
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